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Abstract
We study reasoning in Levesque’s logic of only knowing. In particular, we first prove that
extending a decidable subset of first-order logic with the ability of reasoning about only knowing
preserves decidability of reasoning, as long as quantifying-in is not allowed in the language, and
define a general method for reasoning about only knowing in such a case. Then, we show that the
problem of reasoning about only knowing in the propositional case lies at the second level of the
polynomial hierarchy. Thus, it is as hard as reasoning in the majority of propositional formalisms
for nonmonotonic reasoning, like default logic, circumscription, and autoepistemic logic, and it
is easier than reasoning in propositional formalisms based on the minimal knowledge paradigm,
which is strictly related to the notion of only knowing. Finally, we identify a syntactic restriction in
which reasoning about only knowing is easier than in the general propositional case, and provide a
specialized deduction method for such a restricted setting. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
Research in the formalization of commonsense reasoning through epistemic logics
[18,21,23] has pointed out the need for providing systems (agents) with the ability of
introspecting on their own knowledge and ignorance. To this aim, an epistemic closure
assumption is generally adopted, which informally can be stated as follows: “the logical
theory formalizing the agent is a complete specification of the agent’s knowledge”. As a
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consequence, any fact that is not logically implied by such a theory is assumed to be not
known by the agent. 2
As shown in [18], this paradigm underlies the vast majority of the logical formalizations
of nonmonotonic reasoning. Roughly speaking, there exist two different ways to embed
such a principle into a logic:
(1) by considering a nonmonotonic formalism, whose semantics implicitly realizes such
a “closed” interpretation of the logical theory representing the agent’s knowledge;
(2) by representing the closure assumption explicitly in the framework of a monotonic
logic, suitably extending its syntax and semantics.
The first approach has been pursued in the definition of several modal formalizations of
nonmonotonic reasoning, e.g., McDermott and Doyle’s nonmonotonic modal logics [20],
Halpern and Moses’ logic of minimal epistemic states [9] and Lifschitz’s logic of minimal
belief and negation as failure [19]. On the other hand, the second approach has been
followed by Levesque [18] in the definition of the logic of only knowing.
The logic of only knowing is obtained by adding an “all-I-know” modal operator O to
modal logic K45. Informally, such an interpretation of the modality O is obtained through
a maximization of the set of successors of each world satisfying O-formulas.
There is a strict similarity between the interpretation of the modalityO and the semantics
of nonmonotonic modal logics. Let ϕ be a modal formula specifying the knowledge of the
agent: in the logic of only knowing, satisfiability of the formula Oϕ in a world w requires
maximization of the possible worlds connected to w and satisfying ϕ; an analogous kind
of maximization is generally realized by the preference semantics of nonmonotonic modal
logics, by choosing, among the models for ϕ, only the models having a “maximal” set
of possible worlds, where such a notion of maximality changes according to the different
proposals. In a nutshell, the logic of only knowing is a monotonic formalism, in which the
modalityO allows for an explicit representation of the epistemic closure assumption at the
object level (i.e., in the language of the logic), whereas in nonmonotonic formalisms the
closure assumption is a meta-level notion.
The studies investigating the relationship between only knowing and nonmonotonic
logics [1] have stressed the analogies between the two approaches from an epistemological
viewpoint. An analogous analysis from the computational viewpoint has not been pursued
so far. Indeed, there exist several studies concerning the computational properties of
nonmonotonic logics, in particular propositional nonmonotonic modal formalisms (e.g.,
[3,5,20,22]). On the other hand, the computational properties of only knowing in the
propositional case have not been thoroughly investigated. The only related studies
appearing in the literature concern a fragment of OL built upon a very restricted subclass
of propositional formulas, for which satisfiability is tractable [15], and a computational
study of a framework in which only knowing is added to a formal model of limited
reasoning [13]. Moreover, a lower bound for reasoning in the propositional fragment ofOL
(6p2) is known, due to the fact that autoepistemic logic [21] can be embedded in polynomial
time into OL.
2 The use of the notion of logical implication here may be misleading: to be more precise, the closure
assumption acts by “maximizing ignorance” (in a way that changes according to the different proposals) in each
possible epistemic state of the agent.
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The goal of the present work is to provide algorithms for computing satisfiability in the
logic of only knowing. To this end, we exploit the similarity between this formalism and
nonmonotonic modal logics, in order to identify a finite characterization of the models of
a formula in the logic OL.
The main results of the paper concern both decidability and complexity of reasoning
about only knowing. Specifically, we first prove that extending a decidable subset of first-
order logic (without equality) with the ability of reasoning about only knowing preserves
decidability of reasoning, as long as quantifying-in, i.e., the presence of modalities
inside quantifiers, is not allowed. Moreover, we define a general method for computing
satisfiability in OL without quantifying-in. To the best of our knowledge, such an
algorithm is the first terminating procedure for reasoning about only knowing in any
decidable fragment of first-order logic (e.g., in the full propositional fragment of OL).
Then, we show that the problem of reasoning about only knowing in the proposi-
tional case lies at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. More precisely, satisfi-
ability in the propositional fragment of OL is a 6p2 -complete problem. Thus, reasoning
about only knowing is as hard as reasoning in the majority of propositional formalisms
for nonmonotonic reasoning, like autoepistemic logic [5,22], default logic [5], circum-
scription [4], and several McDermott and Doyle’s logics [20]. Moreover, reasoning about
only knowing is easier (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses) than reasoning in non-
monotonic modal formalisms based on the minimal knowledge paradigm [27], like Halpern
and Moses’ logic of minimal epistemic states [2], Lifschitz’s logic MBNF [24], and the
moderately grounded version of autoepistemic logic [3].
We also define an interesting syntactic restriction of the propositional fragment of OL
in which deduction is easier than in the general case. Specifically, we identify a subset
of formulas in OL for which the satisfiability (and validity) problem is PNP[O(logn)]-
complete, i.e., can be reduced to a logarithmic number of propositional satisfiability
problems. This case is particularly interesting, since it can be viewed as a generalization of
the problem of answering epistemic queries to a propositional knowledge base [6,23].
In the following, we first briefly introduce the modal logic of only knowing OL. Then,
in Section 3 we present a finite characterization of the models of a sentence in OL, which
provides the basis for the definition of reasoning methods for OL. In Section 4 we define
a deduction method for satisfiability (validity) in decidable fragments of OL, and analyze
the computational properties of OL in the propositional fragment of OL; we also define
a syntactic restriction of OL, showing that reasoning in this setting is easier than in the
general case. Finally, in Section 5 we investigate the relationship between only knowing
and the minimal knowledge paradigm, and conclude in Section 6.
2. The logic OL
In this section we briefly recall the formalization of only knowing [18]. We assume that
the reader is familiar with the basic notions of modal logic. We recall that K45 denotes the
modal logic interpreted on Kripke structures whose accessibility relation among worlds is
transitive and Euclidean, while modal logic KD45 imposes in addition that the relation be
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serial; finally, modal logic S5 also imposes reflexivity on the accessibility relation (see,
e.g., [10,20] for more details).
We use L to denote the language of first-order logic without equality, i.e., L is the set
of first-order sentences built in the usual way upon connectives ∧,¬ (the symbols ∨,⊃,≡
are used as abbreviations), an existential quantifier, an infinite set of variables, an infinite
set A of propositional symbols, an infinite set of predicate symbols of every arity, and an
infinite set of function symbols. 3 We assume that A contains the symbols true, false. We
call objective any sentence from L.
Following [18], we interpret sentences from L with respect to a fixed, countably infinite
interpretation domain ∆. As shown in [17], imposing a countably infinite domain does
not influence satisfiability/validity of first-order sentences without equality, i.e., the set of
satisfiable sentences is the same as in classical first-order logic. In the following, we call
interpretation a usual first-order interpretation forL over∆. An interpretation is also called
world. For each interpretationw, w(true)= TRUE and w(false)= FALSE. The evaluation
w(ϕ) of a sentence ϕ in an interpretation w is defined in the usual way. We say that a
sentence ϕ ∈ L is satisfiable if there exists an interpretation w such that w(ϕ) = TRUE
(which we also denote as w |= ϕ).
Definition 2.1. We denote as LO the modal extension of L with the modalities K and O
inductively defined as follows:
(1) if ϕ ∈ L, then ϕ ∈ LO ;
(2) if ϕ ∈ LO , then Kϕ ∈ LO ;
(3) if ϕ ∈ LO , then Oϕ ∈ LO ;
(4) if ϕ ∈ LO , then ¬ϕ ∈LO ;
(5) if ϕ1 ∈LO and ϕ2 ∈LO , then ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈LO ;
(6) nothing else belongs to LO .
Informally, the above definition does not allow quantifying-in, i.e., in all sentences from
LO , each occurrence of the modalities K and O lies outside the scope of quantifiers. E.g.,
the sentence ∀x O(p(x)) does not belong to LO , while the sentence O(∀x p(x)) belongs
to LO .
We also use LK to denote the analogous extension of L with the only modality K . We
call O-sentence a sentence from LO of the form Oϕ. Notice that, with respect to [18], we
slightly change the language of the logic, using the modalityK instead of B .
The semantics of a sentence ϕ ∈ LO is defined in terms of satisfiability in a structure
(w,M) where w is an interpretation (called initial world) andM is a set of interpretations.
Definition 2.2. Let w be an interpretation on L, and let M be a set of such interpretations.
We say that a sentence ϕ ∈ LO is satisfied in (w,M), and write (w,M) |= ϕ, iff the
following conditions hold:
(1) if ϕ ∈ L, then (w,M) |= ϕ iff w(ϕ)= TRUE;
3 The assumption done in [18] that constants are rigid designators (i.e., in each interpretation, each constant
denotes the same element of the interpretation domain) can be omitted here, since the case of quantifying-in is
not dealt with in this paper.
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(2) if ϕ =¬ϕ1, then (w,M) |= ϕ iff (w,M) 6|= ϕ1;
(3) if ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, then (w,M) |= ϕ iff (w,M) |= ϕ1 and (w,M) |= ϕ2;
(4) if ϕ =Kϕ1, then (w,M) |= ϕ iff for every w′ ∈M , (w′,M) |= ϕ1;
(5) if ϕ =Oϕ1, then (w,M) |= ϕ iff for every w′, w′ ∈M iff (w′,M) |= ϕ1.
We say that ϕ ∈LO is weakly OL-satisfiable if there exists (w,M) such that (w,M) |=
ϕ. Since the initial world does not influence satisfiability of a sentence of the form
Kϕ or Oϕ, we write M |= Kϕ (respectively M |= Oϕ) iff (w,M) |= Kϕ (respectively
(w,M) |=Oϕ) for any interpretation w.
The above semantics is not actually the one originally proposed in [18]: in addition
to the above rules, a pair (w,M) must satisfy a maximality condition for the set M , as
described below. However, as mentioned in [7], the above, weaker notion of satisfiability
is also meaningful.
In the following, Th(M) denotes the set of sentences Kϕ such that ϕ ∈ LK and, for
each w ∈M , (w,M) |=Kϕ. Given two sets of interpretations M1,M2, we say that M1 is
equivalent to M2 iff Th(M1)= Th(M2).
Definition 2.3. A set of interpretations M is maximal iff, for each set of interpretations
M ′, if M ′ is equivalent to M then M ′ ⊆M .
Definition 2.4. A sentence ϕ ∈ LO is OL-satisfiable iff there exists a pair (w,M) such
that (w,M) |= ϕ and M is maximal.
Roughly speaking, the maximality condition prevents from the existence of models
which agree on all basic beliefs, yet disagree on what they only know [18, Section 2.2].
We say that a sentence ϕ ∈ LO is OL-valid iff ¬ϕ is not OL-satisfiable. In the next
section we will prove that the notions of OL-satisfiability and weak OL-satisfiability
of a sentence from LO coincide. Notice, however, that OL-satisfiability and weak OL-
satisfiability for infinite theories are, in general, different (see [18, Section 2.4]).
As for reasoning in OL, we give the following definition.
Definition 2.5. A sentence ϕ ∈LO logically implies a sentence ψ ∈LO in OL (and write
ϕ |=OL ψ) iff ϕ ⊃ψ is OL-valid.
Based on the above definition, we can immediately reduce reasoning to unsatisfiability
in OL.
Remark. An alternative definition of logical implication is given in several studies on
epistemic and nonmonotonic modal logics (see, e.g., [20, Definition 7.9]). Such a notion
is based on the following notion of validity of a modal sentence in a model: a formula ϕ
is valid in a Kripke model M iff, for each world w in M, (w,M) |= ϕ. The notion of
logical implication is then expressed as follows: “ψ is logically implied by ϕ iff ψ is valid
in every model in which ϕ is valid”. The two notions are in general different, and such a
difference also holds for the logic OL. However, since in OL the accessibility relation of
each interpretation structure is transitive, it can immediately be shown [20, Remark 7.11]
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that the last notion of logical implication can be reduced to the one given in Definition 2.5,
and hence to validity in OL. In particular, ψ is logically implied by ϕ according to the last
notion iff (ϕ ∧Kϕ)⊃ψ is OL-valid.
Notice that the above semantics strictly relates the logicOL with modal logic K45, since
there is a precise correspondence between the pairs (w,M) used in the above definition
and K45 models. We recall that, with respect to the satisfiability problem, a K45 model can
be considered without loss of generality as a pair (w,M), where w is a world, M is a
set of worlds (possibly empty), w is connected to all the worlds in M, the worlds in M
are connected with each other (i.e., M is a universal S5 model) and no world in M is
connected to w [20] (in the case of KD45 models,M is required to be nonempty). Thus, in
the following we will refer to a pair (w,M) as a K45 model whose S5 component is M .
Notice also that, if Σ ∈ LK , then Σ is OL-satisfiable if and only if it is K45-satisfiable,
which is shown by the fact that, if a K45 model (w,M) satisfies such a Σ , then there exists
a maximal set M ′ equivalent to M , hence (w,M ′) satisfies Σ .
Informally, the interpretation of theO modality is obtained through the maximization of
the set of successors of each world satisfying an O-sentence. As pointed out, e.g., in [14],
the meaning of an O-sentenceOϕ such that ϕ is nonmodal is intuitive, whereas it is more
difficult to understand the semantics of an O-sentence with nested modalities.
Example 2.6. Suppose ϕ ∈ L. Then, (w,M) is a model for Oϕ iff M = {w: w |= ϕ}.
Hence, the effect of prefixing ϕ with the modality O is that of maximizing the possible
worlds in M , which contains all the interpretations consistent with ϕ.
Example 2.7. Suppose ϕ ∈ L and ϕ is not a tautology. Then, the sentence OKϕ is not
OL-satisfiable. In fact, suppose OKϕ is OL-satisfiable. Then, there exists (w,M) such
that (w,M) |= OKϕ. Now, it is easy to see that, by Definition 2.2, M cannot contain any
interpretation w′ such that w′ 6|= ϕ. On the other hand, since ϕ is not a tautology, there
exists such an interpretation w′; moreover, (w′,M) |=Kϕ, since the interpretation of Kϕ
in (w′,M) does not depend on the initial world, hence by Definition 2.2 it follows that
w′ ∈M . Contradiction. Hence, OKϕ is not OL-satisfiable. On the contrary,O(Kϕ∧ ϕ) is
OL-satisfiable, under the assumption that ϕ is satisfiable.
3. Characterizing OL-satisfiability
In this section we present a finite characterization of the models of a sentence Σ ∈ LO
which is based on the use of partitions of modal sentences occurring in Σ . Similar
techniques are used in several methods for reasoning in nonmonotonic modal logics (e.g.,
[2,3,5,20,22]): in such methods, partitions of subformulas of a modal theory are generally
used for providing a finite characterization of the epistemic states of the agent, which
correspond to infinite modal theories. In fact, such partitions can also be used in order to
provide a finite characterization of an S5 model. In particular, a partition satisfying certain
properties identifies a particular S5 modelM, by uniquely determining a nonmodal theory
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(called the objective knowledge ofM).M is then defined as the set of all interpretations
satisfying such objective knowledge.
Now, in order to check whether an O-sentence Oϕ is satisfied in a K45 model (w,M),
we exploit the possibility of expressing, by means of an objective sentence, the objective
knowledge of the S5 component M of (w,M). This allows us to establish whether ϕ is
“all that is known” in the set of interpretationsM .
We first introduce some preliminary definitions. Following [6], we say that an occurrence
of a sentence ψ in a sentence ϕ ∈ LO is strict if it is not in the scope of a modal operator.
We also call modal atom a sentence of the form Kϕ or Oϕ, with ϕ ∈ LO , and call modal
atoms of Σ (denoted by MA(Σ)) the set of modal atoms occurring in Σ .
Definition 3.1. Let Σ ∈ LO and let P,N be sets of modal atoms such that P ∪ N ⊇
MA(Σ) and P ∩N = ∅. We denote with Σ|P,N the objective sentence obtained from Σ
by substituting each strict occurrence in Σ of a sentence in P with true, and each strict
occurrence in Σ of a sentence in N with false.
Notice that only the occurrences in Σ of modal atoms which are not within the scope of
another modality are replaced; notice also that Σ|P,N is an objective sentence. Informally,
the pair (P,N) identifies a “guess” on the modal atoms fromΣ , andΣ|P,N represents the
“objective knowledge” implied by Σ under such a guess.
Definition 3.2. Let (P,N) be a partition of MA(Σ). Then, we denote with ob(P ) the
following objective sentence:
ob(P )=
( ∧
Kϕ∈P
ϕ|P,N
)
∧
( ∧
Oϕ∈P
ϕ|P,N
)
.
Roughly speaking, the objective sentence ob(P ) represents the objective knowledge
implied by the guess (P,N) on the modal atoms belonging to P .
Example 3.3. Suppose Σ = a ∧O(¬a ∨ Kb). Then, MA(Σ) = {O(¬a ∨ Kb),Kb}. One
possible partition of MA(Σ) is the following:
P = {O(¬a ∨Kb)},
N = {Kb}.
Then, Σ|P,N = a ∧ true= a, and ob(P )= (¬a ∨Kb)|P,N =¬a ∨ false=¬a.
Definition 3.4. Let S be a set of modal atoms. We say that a set of interpretations M
induces the partition (P,N) on S if, for each modal atom Kϕ ∈ S, Kϕ ∈ P iff M |=Kϕ,
and for each modal atom Oϕ ∈ S, Oϕ ∈ P iff M |=Oϕ.
We now define the notion of partition of a set of modal atoms induced by an objective
sentence.
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Definition 3.5. Let Σ ∈ LO , ϕ ∈ L. We denote with (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)) the partition of
MA(Σ) induced by M = {w: w |= ϕ}.
Notice that the above definition associates a maximal set of interpretations M with the
sentence ϕ and the partition (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)).
In order to establish a characterization ofOL-satisfiability based on the use of partitions
of modal atoms, we prove some preliminary properties of such partitions.
Lemma 3.6. Let ϕ ∈LO , let w be an interpretation, let M be a set of interpretations, and
let (P,N) be the partition induced by M on a set of modal atoms S. Then, (w,M) |= ϕ iff
(w,M) |= ϕ|P,N .
Proof. Follows immediately from Definitions 3.1 and 2.2. 2
Lemma 3.7. Let Σ ∈ LO , ϕ ∈L. Then:
(1) each modal atom Kψ of MA(Σ) belongs to Pϕ(Σ) iff ϕ ⊃ψ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) is a valid
objective sentence;
(2) each modal atom Oψ of MA(Σ) belongs to Pϕ(Σ) iff ϕ ≡ψ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) is a valid
objective sentence.
Proof. Follows immediately from Definition 2.2. 2
Lemma 3.8. Let Σ ∈ LK . If Σ is K45-satisfiable and KD45-unsatisfiable, then the
partition (P,N) induced by the empty set of interpretations is such that ob(P ) is
unsatisfiable.
Proof. Suppose Σ is K45-satisfiable and KD45-unsatisfiable, and let (w,M) be a K45
model such that (w,M) |= Σ . Then, M = ∅. Let (P,N) be the partition of MA(Σ)
induced by M: since M = ∅, it follows that P = MA(Σ) (each sentence of the form
Kϕ is trivially satisfied by M). Now let M ′ = {w: w |= ob(P )}. We prove that (P,N) =
(Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)). The proof is by induction on the modal depth of the sentences in
MA(Σ). First, let Kϕ be a modal atom of MA(Σ) such that ϕ ∈ L. Then, since Kϕ ∈ P ,
Definition 3.2 implies that ob(P )⊃ ϕ is a valid objective sentence, henceKϕ ∈ Pob(P )(Σ).
Suppose now that (P,N) and (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)) agree on all modal atoms of modal
depth less or equal to i . Consider a modal atom Kϕ of MA(Σ) of modal depth i + 1.
Again, since Kϕ ∈ P , by Definition 3.2 it follows that ob(P )⊃ ϕ|P,N is a valid objective
sentence, hence M ′ |= ϕ|P,N , and since by Definition 3.1 the value of the sentence
ϕ|P,N only depends on the value of the modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i
in (P,N), by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 3.6 it follows that M ′ |= ϕ, hence
Kϕ ∈ Pob(P )(Σ). Consequently, (P,N)= (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)), which in turn implies
that
Σ|P,N =Σ|Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ).
Now, since (w,M) |= Σ , by Lemma 3.6 w |= Σ|P,N , hence w |= Σ|Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)
and, by the same lemma, (w,M ′) |= Σ . Since M ′ = {w: w |= ob(P )} and Σ is KD45-
unsatisfiable, it follows that M ′ is empty, hence ob(P ) is unsatisfiable. 2
R. Rosati / Artificial Intelligence 116 (2000) 193–215 201
We say that a sentence ϕ ∈ LO has modal depth i if each occurrence of an objective
sentence in ϕ lies within the scope of at most i modalities, and there is an occurrence of an
objective sentence in ϕ which lies within the scope of exactly i modalities.
Lemma 3.9. Let Σ ∈ LO , ϕ ∈L. Let (P,N) be the partition of MA(Σ) built as follows:
(1) start from P =N = ∅;
(2) for each modal atom Kψ in MA(Σ) such that ψ|P,N ∈ L, if ϕ ⊃ ψ|P,N is a valid
objective sentence, then add Kψ to P , otherwise add Kψ to N ;
(3) for each modal atom of the form Oψ in MA(Σ) such that ψ|P,N ∈L, if ϕ ≡ψ|P,N
is a valid objective sentence, then add Oψ to P , otherwise add Oψ to N ;
(4) iteratively apply the above rules until P ∪N =MA(Σ).
Then, (P,N)= (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the sentences in MA(Σ). First, from
the fact that (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)) is the partition induced by M = {w: w |= ϕ}, and from
Definition 2.2, it follows that, if ψ ∈ L, then M |= Kψ if and only if ϕ ⊃ ψ is a valid
objective sentence, and M |= Oψ if and only if ϕ ≡ ψ is a valid objective sentence.
Therefore, (P,N) agrees with (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)) on all modal atoms of modal depth 1.
Suppose now that (P,N) and (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)) agree on all modal atoms of modal depth
less or equal to i . Consider a modal atom Kψ of MA(Σ) of modal depth i + 1. From
Lemma 3.7 it follows that M |=Kψ if and only if ϕ ⊃ ψ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) is a valid objective
sentence, and since by Definition 3.1 the value of the sentence ψ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) only depends
on the guess of the modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i in (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)), by
the induction hypothesis it follows that ψ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) = ψ|P,N , hence Kψ belongs to P
if and only if it belongs to Pϕ(Σ). Analogously, it can be proven that any modal atom of
depth i + 1 of the form Oψ belongs to P if and only if it belongs to Pϕ(Σ). Therefore,
(P,N) and (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)) agree on all modal atoms of modal depth i + 1. 2
In the following, the sentence Σ[O/false] stands for the sentence obtained from Σ by
replacing all O-sentences occurring in Σ with false. Notice that Σ[O/false] ∈ LK , hence
such a sentence is OL-satisfiable if and only if it is K45-satisfiable.
We are now ready to provide a characterization of the notion of satisfiability in OL,
based on the existence of a partition (P,N) of MA(Σ) which satisfies the property
(P,N)= (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)).
Theorem 3.10. Let Σ ∈ LO . Then, Σ is OL-satisfiable iff at least one of the following
two conditions holds:
(a) Σ[O/false] is KD45-satisfiable;
(b) there exists a partition (P,N) of MA(Σ) such that Σ|P,N is satisfiable and
(P,N)= (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)).
Proof.
If part. Suppose that either condition (a) or condition (b) of the theorem holds. Then,
there are two possible cases:
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(1) Σ[O/false] is KD45-satisfiable. Then, there exists a K45 model (w,M) such that
M 6= ∅ and (w,M) |=Σ[O/false]. Let p′ be a propositional symbol not appearing
in Σ : without loss of generality, we can assume that M contains at least one world
evaluating p′ to TRUE, and at least one world evaluating p′ to FALSE. Let M ′ be
the maximal set equivalent to M: since Th(M ′) = Th(M), it follows that (w,M ′)
satisfies Σ[O/false]. Now let M ′′ be the set of interpretations obtained from M ′
by eliminating all interpretations w′ such that w′(p′) = FALSE. By construction,
M ′′ is maximal and nonempty. Consider the model (w,M ′′): on the one hand,
(w,M ′′) satisfies Σ[O/false], since p′ does not appear in Σ ; on the other hand,
since all interpretations in M ′′ satisfy p′, M ′′ |=Kp′. Now consider a modal atom
of the form Oϕ in MA(Σ), and suppose M ′′ |= Oϕ. Let (P,N) be the partition
induced by M ′′ on MA(Σ): from Lemma 3.6 it follows that M ′′ |=Oϕ|P,N . Then,
since M ′′ |=Kp′, from Definition 2.2 it follows that ϕ|P,N ⊃ p′ is a valid objective
sentence. Since p′ does not occur in ϕ, ϕ|P,N ⊃ p′ is valid iff ϕ|P,N is unsatisfiable,
but, if we assume ϕ|P,N unsatisfiable, then by Definition 2.2 M ′′ |= K false, thus
contradicting the hypothesis that M ′′ be nonempty. Therefore, for each modal atom
Oϕ in MA(Σ), M ′′ 6|= Oϕ, and since (w,M ′′) satisfies Σ[O/false], Lemma 3.6
implies that (w,M ′′) satisfies Σ . Since M ′′ is maximal, it follows that Σ is OL-
satisfiable.
(2) There exists a partition (P,N) of MA(Σ) such that Σ|P,N is satisfiable and
(P,N) = (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)). Now, since Σ|P,N is satisfiable, there exists
an interpretation satisfying Σ|P,N . Let w be such an interpretation, and let M =
{w′: w′ |= ob(P )}. Since (P,N) = (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)), it follows that (P,N)
is the partition of MA(Σ) induced by M . Therefore, since w satisfies Σ|P,N , from
Lemma 3.6 it follows that (w,M) |=Σ . Moreover, M is maximal by construction,
hence Σ is OL-satisfiable.
Only-if part. Suppose Σ is OL-satisfiable. Then, there exists a K45 model (w,M) such
that (w,M) |=Σ andM is maximal. Let (P,N) be the partition induced byM on MA(Σ).
There are two possible cases.
(1) All modal atoms of MA(Σ) of the formOϕ belong to N . Then, from Lemma 3.6, it
follows that (w,M) |=Σ[O/false], i.e., Σ[O/false] is K45-satisfiable. Now, there
are two possibilities:
– Σ[O/false] is KD45-satisfiable. In this case, condition (a) of the theorem holds;
– Σ[O/false] is not KD45-satisfiable. In this case, from Lemma 3.8 it follows
that ob(P ) is unsatisfiable. Moreover, M is empty, hence M = {w: w |=
ob(P )}. Therefore, (P,N) coincides with the partition induced by ob(P ), that
is, (P,N) = (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)). Furthermore, since (w,M) |= Σ and
(P,N) is the partition induced by M on MA(Σ), from Lemma 3.6 it follows
that the interpretation w satisfies Σ|P,N , hence condition (b) of the theorem
holds.
(2) At least one modal atom of MA(Σ) of the form Oϕ belongs to P . Then, since
(w,M) satisfies Σ , it follows that M = {w: w |= ϕ|P,N }; moreover, by definition
of ob(P ) it follows that ob(P ) is equivalent to ϕ|P,N , thus (P,N) coincides
with the partition induced by ob(P ), that is, (P,N) = (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)).
Furthermore, since (w,M) |= Σ and (P,N) is the partition induced by M on
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MA(Σ), from Lemma 3.6 it follows that the interpretation w satisfies Σ|P,N , hence
condition (b) of the theorem holds. 2
Intuitively, the above theorem provides for a characterization of the notion of OL-
satisfiability of a formula Σ in terms of properties of partitions of the modal atoms of
Σ . Specifically, the theorem states that a formula Σ ∈ LO is OL-satisfiable iff either
Σ[O/false] is KD45-satisfiable, which informally corresponds to checking whether it is
consistent to assume as false every O-sentence occurring in Σ , or there exists a partition
(P,N) of MA(Σ) such that Σ|P,N is satisfiable and (P,N) = (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)),
which corresponds to checking whether there exists a guess of the modal atoms ofΣ which
is both consistent with Σ and not self-contradictory.
From the above theorem, it is easy to prove that the two notions ofOL-satisfiability and
weak OL-satisfiability coincide in the case of formulas from LO .
Theorem 3.11. Let Σ ∈LO . Then, Σ is OL-satisfiable iff it is weakly OL-satisfiable.
Proof. Follows immediately from the fact that the proof of the only-if part of Theo-
rem 3.10 holds even if the assumption that M is maximal is discarded, since such an as-
sumption is not used in the proof. This in turn implies that Σ is weakly OL-satisfiable iff
conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem 3.10 hold. Thus, from the same theorem, it follows that
Σ is weakly OL-satisfiable iff Σ is OL-satisfiable. 2
A property analogous to the above theorem has been proved in [8] for the propositional
fragment of OL.
4. Reasoning in OL
In this section we study reasoning in OL. In particular, we first show that extending
a decidable fragment of first-order logic with only knowing preserves decidability of
reasoning. Then, we establish an upper bound for the satisfiability problem in the
propositional fragment of OL, and finally analyze a restriction of the propositional case in
which reasoning is computationally easier.
We briefly introduce the complexity classes mentioned in the following (refer, e.g.,
to [11] for further details). All the classes we use reside in the polynomial hierarchy. In
particular, the complexity class 6p2 is the class of problems that are solved in polynomial
time by a nondeterministic Turing machine that uses an NP-oracle (i.e., that solves in
constant time any problem in NP), and5p2 is the class of problems that are complement of a
problem in 6p2 . The class PNP, also known as1
p
2, is the class of problems that are solved in
polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine that uses an NP-oracle, while the class
PNP[O(logn)], also known as 2p2, is the class of problems that are solved in polynomial
time by a deterministic Turing machine that makes a number of calls to an NP-oracle which
is logarithmic in the size of the input. Hence, the class PNP[O(logn)] is “mildly” harder
than the class NP, since a problem in PNP[O(logn)] can be solved by solving “few” (i.e.,
a logarithmic number of) instances of problems in NP. It is generally assumed that the
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polynomial hierarchy does not collapse, and that a problem in the class PNP[O(logn)] is
computationally easier than a 6p2-hard or 5
p
2-hard problem.
4.1. Reasoning method
As for effective methods for reasoning in OL, we recall that OL-satisfiability in
unrestricted LO is not a decidable problem, since establishing OL-satisfiability of
objective sentences corresponds to solving the satisfiability problem for full first-order
logic. However, the characterization provided by Theorem 3.10 allows for the definition of
an algorithm for reasoning in subsets of LO built upon decidable fragments of first-order
logic. In the following, we say that a language L′ ⊆ L is closed under boolean composition
if, for each ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L′, ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 ∈ L′ and ¬ϕ1 ∈ L′. Moreover, we denote as L′O the subset
of LO built upon L′, i.e., the modal extension of L′ obtained according to Definition 2.1.
To the aim of identifying decidable fragments of LO , we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let Σ ∈ LK . Then, Σ is KD45-satisfiable iff there exists a partition (P,N)
of MA(Σ) such that:
(a) Σ|P,N is satisfiable;
(b) for each Kϕ ∈N , ob(P )∧¬ϕ|P,N is satisfiable;
(c) ob(P ) is satisfiable.
Proof.
If part. Let (P,N) be a partition of MA(Σ) satisfying conditions (a), (b), and (c) of the
lemma, and let M = {w: w |= ob(P )}. Condition (c) implies M 6= ∅. Moreover, since
Σ|P,N is satisfiable, there exists an interpretation w such that w |= Σ|P,N . Now we
prove, by induction on the modal depth of the modal atoms in MA(Σ), that (P,N) =
(Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)). First, from Lemma 3.7 and condition (b), it follows that each
modal atom Kϕ in N of modal depth 1 (i.e., such that ϕ ∈ L) also belongs to Nob(P )(Σ);
moreover, Definition 3.2 and Lemma 3.7 imply that each modal atom Kϕ in P of modal
depth 1 belongs to Pob(P )(Σ). Now suppose that (P,N) and (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ))
agree on all modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i . Consider a modal atom Kϕ of
MA(Σ) of modal depth i+ 1. Since by Definition 3.1 the value of the sentence ϕ|P,N only
depends on the value of the modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i in (P,N), by
the induction hypothesis it follows that
ϕ|P,N = ϕ|Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ),
hence condition (b) and Lemma 3.7 imply that, if Kϕ ∈ N , then Kϕ ∈ Nob(P )(Σ), while
Definition 3.2 and Lemma 3.7 imply that, if Kϕ ∈ P , then Kϕ ∈ Pob(P )(Σ). Therefore,
(P,N)= (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)), and since w |=Σ|P,N and (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)) is
the partition of MA(Σ) induced byM , from Lemma 3.6 it follows that (w,M) |=Σ , which
proves that Σ is KD45-satisfiable.
Only-if part. Suppose Σ is KD45-satisfiable. Then, there exists a model (w,M) such
that (w,M) |= Σ and M 6= ∅. Let (P,N) be the partition of MA(Σ) induced by M .
Then, from Lemma 3.6 it follows that w |= Σ|P,N , hence condition (a) holds. We now
prove, by induction on the modal depth of the modal atoms in MA(Σ), that (P,N) =
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(Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)). Let M ′ = {w: w |= ob(P )}. First, by Definition 3.2 it follows
that, for each Kϕ ∈ MA(Σ) such that ϕ ∈ L, M |= Kϕ iff M ′ |= Kϕ, hence Kϕ ∈ P
iff Kϕ ∈ Pob(P )(Σ). Now suppose that (P,N) and (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)) agree on all
modal atoms of modal depth less or equal to i . Consider a modal atom Kϕ of MA(Σ) of
modal depth i + 1. Since Kϕ ∈ P , by Definition 3.2 it follows that ob(P ) ⊃ ϕ|P,N is a
valid objective sentence, hence M ′′ |= ϕ|P,N , and since by Definition 3.1 the value of the
sentence ϕ|P,N only depends on the value of the modal atoms of modal depth less or equal
to i in (P,N), by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 3.6 it follows that M ′ |= ϕ, hence
Kϕ ∈ Pob(P )(Σ). Consequently, (P,N)= (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)), and by Lemma 3.7 it
follows that condition (b) holds. Finally, since M 6= ∅, it follows that ob(P ) is satisfiable,
hence condition (c) holds. 2
We are now ready to prove decidability ofOL-satisfiability for subsets of LO built upon
decidable subsets of the first-order language L.
Theorem 4.2. Let L′ ⊂ L. If L′ is closed under boolean composition and satisfiability in
L′ is decidable, then OL-satisfiability in L′O is decidable.
Proof. Let Σ ∈ L′O . Theorem 3.10 implies that OL-satisfiability of Σ can be decided
through the following steps.
(1) First, checking KD45-satisfiability of Σ[O/false]. From Lemma 4.1, this can be
accomplished by verifying the existence of a partition (P,N) of MA(Σ[O/false])
such that:
(a) Σ[O/false]|P,N is satisfiable. Since L′ is closed under boolean composition, it
follows thatΣ[O/false]|P,N ∈ L′, and since satisfiability in L′ is decidable, this
check is decidable.
(b) For eachKϕ ∈N , ob(P )∧¬ϕ|P,N is satisfiable. Again, sinceL′ is closed under
boolean composition, it follows that, for each Kϕ ∈ N , ob(P ) ∧ ¬ϕ|P,N ∈ L′,
hence this check is decidable.
(c) ob(P ) is satisfiable. Again, since ob(P ) ∈L′, this check is decidable.
(2) Verifying the existence of a partition (P,N) of MA(Σ) such thatΣ|P,N is satisfiable
and (P,N) = (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)). Again, since L′ is closed under boolean
composition, Σ|P,N ∈ L′, hence verifying satisfiability of Σ|P,N is decidable.
Moreover, since L′ is closed under boolean composition, and since satisfiability
in L′ is decidable, Lemma 3.9 provides an effective method to build the partition
(Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)) in a finite amount of time, hence checking whether
(Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)) is equal to (P,N) is decidable. 2
Therefore, the above theorem states that reasoning about only knowing in the modal
extension (without quantifying-in) of a decidable fragment of first-order logic closed under
boolean composition is decidable.
In Fig. 1 we present the algorithm OL-Sat for computing satisfiability in any fragment
L′O of LO satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.2. The algorithm is based on
Theorem 3.10, and relies on both Lemma 4.1, which provides a method for computing
KD45-satisfiability in L′K by using a procedure for computing satisfiability in L′, and
206 R. Rosati / Artificial Intelligence 116 (2000) 193–215
Algorithm OL-Sat(Σ )
Input: sentence Σ ∈L′
O
;
Output: true if Σ is OL-satisfiable, false otherwise.
begin
if Σ[O/false] is KD45-satisfiable
then return true
else if there exists partition (P,N) of MA(Σ) such that
(a) Σ |P,N is satisfiable and
(b) (P,N)= (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ))
then return true
else return false
end
Fig. 1. Algorithm OL-Sat.
Lemma 3.9, which provides a constructive way to build the partition (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ))
starting from the sentences Σ and ϕ, again using a procedure for satisfiability in L′.
Therefore, the algorithm computes OL-satisfiability in L′O by reducing such a problem to
a number of satisfiability problems in L′. Correctness of the algorithm follows immediately
from Theorem 3.10.
Informally, the algorithm first checks whether it is possible to satisfy Σ by assuming as
false allO-sentences occurring inΣ , that is, by making no closure assumptions about what
is known. If in this way it is not possible to satisfy Σ , that is, the sentence Σ[O/false] is
not KD45-satisfiable, then the algorithm checks whether there exists a partition (P,N) of
MA(Σ) satisfying certain conditions. Intuitively, the partition must be consistent with Σ
(condition (a)) and cannot be self-contradictory (condition (b)). In particular, the condition
(P,N)= (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)) establishes that the objective knowledge implied by the
partition (P,N) (that is, the sentence ob(P )) identifies a set of interpretations which
induces the same partition (P,N) on MA(Σ). We illustrate the algorithm through the
following simple example.
Example 4.3. Let us consider the sentence Σ defined in Example 3.3. Then,
Σ[O/false] = a ∧ false= false,
henceΣ[O/false] is not KD45-satisfiable. Now, consider the partition (P,N)= ({O(¬a∨
Kb)}, {Kb}) of MA(Σ). As shown in Example 3.3, Σ|P,N = a, hence (P,N) satisfies
condition (a) of the algorithm. Now, since ob(P ) = ¬a, and (¬a ∨ Kb)|P,N = ¬a, it
follows that O(¬a ∨ Kb) ∈ Pob(P )(Σ). Moreover, the objective sentence ¬a ⊃ b is not
valid, hence Kb ∈Nob(P )(Σ). Therefore,
(P,N)= (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)),
i.e., condition (b) of the algorithm is satisfied. Consequently, OL-Sat(Σ) returns true. In
fact, the partition (P,N) identifies the set of interpretationsM = {w: w |= ¬a}. Moreover,
since Σ|P,N is satisfiable, it follows that there exists an interpretationw satisfyingΣ|P,N ,
which implies that (w,M) |=Σ .
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4.2. Propositional case: Complexity
We now study the complexity of reasoning about only knowing in the propositional case.
To this aim, we analyze the complexity of the algorithm OL-Sat, reported in Fig. 1, under
the restriction that Σ is a modal propositional formula. To the best of our knowledge, such
an algorithm is the first terminating method for reasoning about only knowing in the full
propositional case. 4 In the following, we denote as Lp the propositional fragment of L,
and with LpO the propositional fragment of LO .
Observe that, if Σ ∈ LpO , then all formulas involved in the conditions reported in
the algorithm are propositional, hence all such conditions can be checked by solving
propositional satisfiability/validity problems. In particular:
– Satisfiability in propositional KD45 can be computed in nondeterministic polynomial
time, since such a problem is NP-complete [10]. Membership in NP is also an
immediate consequence of Lemma 4.1.
– Condition (a) can be checked in time linear with respect to the size of Σ .
– Given (P,N), the formula ob(P ) can be computed in time linear with respect to the
size of P . Moreover, by Lemma 3.9 it follows that, since MA(Σ) has size linear with
respect to the size of Σ , construction of the partition (Pob(P )(Σ),Nob(P )(Σ)) can
be performed through a linear number (with respect to the size of Σ) of calls to an
NP-oracle for propositional satisfiability. Therefore, condition (b) can be checked in
linear time (with respect to the size of Σ) using an NP-oracle.
Now, since the guess of the partition (P,N) of MA(Σ) requires a nondeterministic
choice, it follows that the algorithmOL-Sat, if considered as a nondeterministic procedure,
is able to establish satisfiability of a formulaΣ ∈ LpO in nondeterministic polynomial time
(with respect to the size ofΣ), using an NP-oracle for propositional satisfiability. Thus, we
obtain an upper bound of 6p2 for the problem.
Lemma 4.4. Let Σ ∈ LpO . The problem of establishing OL-satisfiability of Σ is in 6p2 .
As for the lower bound of the satisfiability problem in propositional OL, we recall that
reasoning in Moore’s autoepistemic logic (AEL) [21] can be reduced to reasoning in OL.
We now briefly recall the notion of stable expansion in AEL. In order to keep notation to a
minimum, we change the language of AEL, using the modalityK instead of L: thus, in the
following a formula of AEL is a formula belonging to the propositional fragment of LK
(denoted as LpK ).
A set of formulas T from LpK is a stable expansion for a formula Σ ∈ LpK if T satisfies
the equation
T = Cn({Σ} ∪ {Kϕ: ϕ ∈ T } ∪ {¬Kϕ: ϕ /∈ T }),
where Cn is the logical consequence operator of propositional logic.
Proposition 4.5 [18, Theorem 3.9]. Let ϕ ∈LpK . Then,Oϕ isOL-satisfiable iff there exists
a stable expansion for ϕ.
4 In fact, Levesque’s axiomatization of the propositional fragment of OL [18] does not directly imply the
existence of a terminating procedure for reasoning in the propositional fragment of OL.
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Lemma 4.6. Let Σ ∈LpO . The problem of establishingOL-satisfiability of Σ is 6p2 -hard.
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ LpK . By Proposition 4.5, Oϕ is OL-satisfiable iff there exists a stable
expansion for ϕ. And since the problem of establishing whether a formula ϕ ∈ LpK admits
a stable expansion is 6p2 -hard [5, Theorem 4.3], this proves the thesis. 2
The last two lemmas imply the following property.
Theorem 4.7. Let Σ ∈ LpO . The problem of establishing OL-satisfiability of Σ is 6p2 -
complete.
The previous theorem implies that validity in propositional OL is 5p2-complete, and
that the logical implication problem ϕ |=OL ψ is 5p2-complete as well (with respect to
the size of ϕ ∧ ψ). Consequently, the algorithm OL-Sat is “optimal” with respect to the
complexity of satisfiability in propositional OL, in the sense that it matches the lower
bound of the problem.
4.3. Propositional case: Restrictions
We now define an interesting subset of propositional OL in which the modality O can
be used in a restricted way. We prove that reasoning in such a fragment of OL is easier
than in the general propositional case.
First, from Lemma 4.6 it follows that if we impose no restrictions on formulas which lie
within the scope of the operatorO , then OL-satisfiability is a 6p2 -hard problem. Hence, in
order to find a fragment of LpO for which satisfiability is computationally easier, we need
to impose some restrictions on the structure of O-subformulas.
The first significant restriction corresponds to the case of formulas of the form Oϕ ∧
¬Kψ in which ϕ ∈ Lp, ψ ∈LpK . Satisfiability of this kind of formulas in OL is analogous
to a reasoning problem which has been analyzed in several different settings (e.g., [5,18,
23]), and corresponds to posing an epistemic queryψ ∈LpK to the propositional knowledge
base ϕ, interpreting queries under the following intuitive epistemic closure assumption:
– for any ξ ∈ Lp, if ξ is logically implied (in propositional logic) by ϕ then Kξ is
implied by ϕ, otherwise ¬Kξ is implied by ϕ;
– the interpretation of an epistemic query ψ with nested occurrences of the modal
operator is obtained by iteratively checking all modal subformulas Kξ such that
ξ ∈ Lp, then substituting all such subformulas with true or false in ψ accordingly, thus
obtaining new modal subformulas in ψ without nested occurrences of the modality;
when all modal subformulas in ψ have been replaced in this way, it can be checked
whether ψ is implied by ϕ.
It can be shown (see [18, Corollary 3.13]) thatOϕ∧¬Kψ is satisfiable if and only if ψ
is not implied by ϕ under the above semantics for epistemic queries. Moreover, it is known
that the problem is PNP[O(logn)]-complete [6], that is, it can be solved in polynomial time
through a number of calls to the NP-oracle which is logarithmic in the size of the formula
ϕ ∧ ψ . Therefore, satisfiability in OL of a formula of the form Oϕ ∧ ¬Kψ in which
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ϕ ∈Lp, ψ ∈ LpK , is PNP[O(logn)]-complete as well, hence it is easier than the problem of
OL-satisfiability of a generic formula in LpO .
We now define a large superclass of the above set of formulas, and show that satisfiability
in OL for such kind of formulas is still easier than in the general case.
Definition 4.8. Let LSO denote the set of formulas belonging to LpO in which each
propositional symbol lies within the scope of a modality. Then, we denote with L−O the
set of formulas belonging to LpO in which each O-subformula Oϕ is such that ϕ is of the
form f ∧ψ or f ∨ψ , with f ∈ Lp, ψ ∈ LSO .
Notice that the only restriction imposed by the above definition is on the form of O-
subformulas: roughly speaking, in each O-subformula ϕ it must be possible to isolate an
“objective” (i.e., belonging to Lp) and a “subjective” (i.e., belonging to LSO ) subformula.
For instance, the formula Σ = a ∧O(¬a ∨Kb) defined in Example 3.3 belongs to the set
L−O , since theO-subformulaO(¬a∨Kb) has an objective subformula¬a and a subjective
subformula Kb. Conversely, the formula a ∧O(¬a ∨ (Kb ∧ c)) does not belong to the set
L−O , since the subformula Kb∧ c is neither objective nor subjective.
The language L−O allows for a nice formalization of a generalization of the above
mentioned setting of epistemic queries, in which one can express queries regarding the
epistemic state of a number (say n) of propositional knowledge bases. A multimodal
language with n operators K1, . . . ,Kn can be used for expressing the epistemic state
of each of the knowledge bases. Given a set of n propositional knowledge bases K =
{KB1, . . . ,KBn}, in which each KBi is a formula from Lp, we define an epistemic query to
K as a boolean combination of epistemic queries to the single knowledge bases. E.g., we
can pose a query of the form
Q=K1ϕ ∧ (¬K2ψ ∨K3ξ)
such that ϕ is an epistemic query to KB1 (i.e., in which the only modalityK1 is used), ψ is
an epistemic query to KB2, and ξ is an epistemic query to KB3. Q is implied by K if and
only if ϕ is implied by KB1 and either ψ is not implied by KB2 or ξ is implied by KB3. It
is immediate to see that the evaluation of such forms of epistemic queries can be reduced
to checking validity of formulas in L−O . In the case of the above example,Q is implied byK iff the formula
(OKB1 ⊃Kϕ′)∧
(
(OKB2 ⊃¬Kψ ′)∨ (OKB3 ⊃Kξ ′)
)
is OL-valid, where ϕ′ is obtained from ϕ by substituting each occurrence of K1 with K ,
and ψ ′, ξ ′ are obtained in a similar way from ψ and ξ .
We now prove that OL-satisfiability for a formula Σ belonging to L−O is easier than for
generic formulas in LpO . Informally, the key point is that the syntactic restriction satisfied
by a formula in L−O allows for easily identifying a “small” (i.e., linear in the size of Σ)
number of possible sets of propositional interpretations, each one represented in terms of
a propositional formula. In particular, given Σ ∈ L−O , there is a finite number (say n) of
occurrences of O-subformulas in Σ , and each of such formulas is of the form fi ∧ ψi or
fi ∨ψi , with fi ∈ Lp andψi ∈LSO , for i = 1, . . . , n: it is then possible to show that a model
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Algorithm L−
O
-Sat(Σ )
Input: formula Σ ∈ L−
O
;
Output: true if Σ is OL-satisfiable, false otherwise.
begin
if Σ[O/false] is KD45-satisfiable
then return true
else if there exists ϕ in SΣ = {f1, f2, . . . , fn, true, false} such that
Σ |Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) is satisfiable
then return true
else return false
end
Fig. 2. Algorithm L−
O
-Sat.
(w,M) forΣ must be such thatM is one of the maximal sets of interpretations represented
by one of the fi ’s (plus the formulas true, false). This property simplifies the problem of
finding a model for Σ , since in this case the search can be restricted to a linear number of
candidate sets of interpretations, while in the general case there is an exponential number
of such candidate sets (represented in the algorithm OL-Sat by all the possible partitions
of the modal atoms of Σ).
In Fig. 2 we present the algorithm L−O -Sat for computing OL-satisfiability of formulas
in L−O . In the algorithm, we assume without loss of generality that the set MA(Σ) contains
n> 0 modal atoms prefixed by the operatorO , of the formO(fi ∧ψi) or O(fi ∨ψi), for
i = 1, . . . , n, with fi ∈ Lp, ψi ∈LSO .
Example 4.9. Let us again consider the formula Σ = a ∧ O(¬a ∨ Kb) defined in
Example 3.3. As shown before, Σ[O/false] is not KD45-satisfiable. Moreover, SΣ =
{¬a, true, false}. Now let ϕ = ¬a. As shown before, Pϕ(Σ) = {O(¬a ∨ Kb)}, Nϕ(Σ) =
{Kb}, and Σ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) = a ∧ true is satisfiable. Therefore, L−O -Sat(Σ) returns true.
Correctness of the algorithm is established by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10. Let Σ ∈L−O . Then, Σ is OL-satisfiable iff L−O -Sat(Σ) returns true.
Proof.
If part. Suppose L−O -Sat(Σ) returns true. Then, there are two possible cases:
(1) Σ[O/false] is KD45-satisfiable. As shown in the proof of Theorem 3.10, this implies
that Σ is OL-satisfiable.
(2) There exists a formula ϕ in the set SΣ = {f1, . . . , fn, true, false} such that
Σ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) is satisfiable. Now let M = {w′: w′ |= ϕ}; moreover, let w be an
interpretation satisfying the satisfiable propositional formula Σ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ). From
the definition of (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)) it follows that each modal atom in MA(Σ) is
satisfied by (w,M) iff it belongs to Pϕ(Σ). Therefore, (w,M) satisfies Σ , and
since M is maximal by construction, it follows that Σ is OL-satisfiable.
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Only-if part. Suppose Σ is OL-satisfiable. Then, there is a model (w,M) satisfying Σ
and such that M is maximal. Let (P,N) be the partition induced by M on MA(Σ). Then,
there are two possible cases.
(1) There is no modal atom of the form Oϕ in P . Then, Σ[O/false] ∈ LpK is K45-
satisfiable, since (w,M) satisfies it. Now, there are two possibilities:
– Σ[O/false] is KD45-satisfiable. In this case, the algorithm L−O -Sat(Σ) returns
true.
– Σ[O/false] is not KD45-satisfiable. In this case, from Lemma 3.8 it follows
that ob(P ) is unsatisfiable, hence ob(P ) is equivalent to false. Moreover, M
is empty, hence M = {w: w |= false}. Therefore, (P,N) coincides with the
partition induced by false, that is, (P,N) = (Pfalse(Σ),Nfalse(Σ)). Furthermore,
since (w,M) |= Σ and (P,N) is the partition induced by M on MA(Σ),
from Lemma 3.6 it follows that the interpretation w satisfies Σ|P,N , hence the
algorithm L−O -Sat(Σ) returns true.
(2) There exists Oϕ ∈ P . Then, since (w,M) satisfies Σ and M is maximal, it follows
that M = {w′: w′ |= ϕ|P,N }. Now, since by hypothesis Σ ∈ L−O , Oϕ is of the form
fi ∧ψ or fi ∨ψ , with 16 i 6 n and ψ ∈LSO , therefore ψ|P,N is equivalent either
to true or to false, which implies that ϕ|P,N is equivalent to one of the formulas
in the set SΣ = {f1, . . . , fn, true, false}. Consequently, (P,N) is induced by one of
the formulas in SΣ , and since the formula Σ|P,N is satisfiable, it follows that the
algorithm L−O -Sat(Σ) returns true. 2
We now analyze the complexity of the algorithm L−O -Sat reported in Fig. 2. As noticed
above, the partition (Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ)) can be computed through a linear number (with
respect to the size of Σ) of calls to an NP-oracle for propositional satisfiability. Now,
since the cardinality of MA(Σ) (and hence the number of formulas in the set SΣ ) is also
linearly bounded by the size of Σ , it follows that the algorithm L−O -Sat is able to establish
OL-satisfiability of a formulaΣ ∈L−O in deterministic polynomial time (in the size ofΣ),
using an NP-oracle for propositional satisfiability.
More precisely, it can be shown that the problem of OL-satisfiability of a formula Σ
in L−O is PNP[O(logn)]-complete, namely it can be computed in polynomial time by a
logarithmic (in the size of Σ) number of calls to an NP-oracle. To this aim, we recall
the decision problem TREES(SAT) and the notion of NP-tree [6]. An NP-tree is a triple
〈Var,G,Fr 〉 in which:
– Var is a set of propositional variables v1, . . . , vn (called the linking variables);
– G = (V ,E) is a directed tree, with edges directed from the leaves to the root. Each
element of the set of nodes V = {F1, . . . ,Fn} contains a propositional formula Fi
built upon a set of private propositional symbols (i.e., symbols which do not appear
in any other node) and the linking variables vj such that (Fj ,Fi) ∈E;
– Fr is a distinguished node, called terminal node.
The truth assignment σ to the propositional variables in an NP-tree is defined as follows:
σ(vi) = TRUE iff the formula F ′i is satisfiable, where F ′i stands for for the formula
obtained from Fi by replacing each propositional linking variable vj occurring in Fi with
true if σ(vj )= TRUE, and with false if σ(vj )= FALSE. The result value of an NP-tree is
the value σ(vr ).
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The decision problem TREES(SAT) is the problem of establishing, given an NP-tree
T , whether the result value of T is TRUE. It has been shown [6, Theorem 4.5] that
TREES(SAT) is PNP[O(logn)]-complete.
Theorem 4.11. Let Σ ∈ L−O . Then, the problem of establishing OL-satisfiability of Σ is
PNP[O(logn)]-complete.
Proof. Hardness follows from the aforementioned fact that satisfiability in OL of a
formula of the formOϕ∧¬Kψ such that ϕ ∈ Lp, ψ ∈LpK , corresponds to verify whether
the epistemic query ψ is not implied by ϕ. In turn, this last problem corresponds (see [6])
to check nonmembership of the formula Kψ in the stable set identified by the formula ϕ,
which is a PNP[O(logn)]-complete problem [6, Theorem 5.3.6].
As for membership in PNP[O(logn)], we show that the condition expressed in the
innermost if-then-else statement in the algorithm L−O -Sat, namely the existence of a
formula ϕ among {f1, f2, . . . , fn, true, false} such that Σ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) is satisfiable, can
be computed in PNP[O(logn)]. To this aim, we reduce, in time polynomial in the size of
Σ , the problem of checking whether such a statement returns true to TREES(SAT). We
construct the NP-tree T (Σ) as follows. 5 First, let m= n+ 2, fn+1 = true, fn+2 = false.
We start from the following tree:
– Fr = v1 ∨ v2 ∨ · · · ∨ vm;
– Fi =Σ , for i = 1, . . . ,m;
– E = {(Fi,Fr): i = 1, . . . ,m}.
Then, we obtain T (Σ) by expanding each node Fi (i = 1, . . . ,m) of the above tree as
follows. Let F be the node Fi or any successor node of Fi . Now:
– for each strict occurrence of a formula Kϕ in F , create a new node Fj =¬(fi ⊃ ϕ),
replace such an occurrence of Kϕ in F with the linking variable vj , and add the edge
(Fj ,F ) to E;
– for each strict occurrence of a formula Oϕ in F , create a new node Fj =¬(fi ≡ ϕ),
replace such an occurrence of Oϕ in F with the linking variable vj , and add the edge
(Fj ,F ) to E.
We repeat the above expansion until there are no nodes in T (Σ) which contain modal
operators. Now, let vj be a linking variable occurring in a node Fi or in a successor node
of Fi , and let ϕ be the modal atom that generates vj in the above construction. From
Lemma 3.7 it immediately follows that σ(vj ) = TRUE iff ϕ ∈ Pfi (Σ). Consequently,
for each node Fi such that 1 6 i 6 m, Fi is satisfiable iff Σ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) is satisfiable.
And since Fr = v1 ∨ · · · ∨ vm, it follows that the result value of T (Σ) is TRUE iff there
exists ϕ ∈ {f1, . . . , fm} such that Σ|Pϕ(Σ),Nϕ(Σ) is satisfiable. Moreover, it is immediate
to verify that T (Σ) can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of Σ . Therefore,
the condition expressed by the innermost if-then-else statement of the algorithm L−O -Sat
can be computed in PNP[O(logn)]. And since satisfiability in propositional KD45 can be
computed in nondeterministic polynomial time, Theorem 4.10 implies that the satisfiability
problem for formulas in L−O is in PNP[O(logn)]. 2
5 The construction trivially extends the technique employed in [6] in the case of Carnap’s modal logic.
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5. Only knowing versus minimal knowledge
As mentioned in the introduction, only knowing is strictly related to the minimal
knowledge principle. We now compare these two notions from the computational
viewpoint.
The principle of minimal knowledge is a very general notion which can be phrased as
follows: “In each possible epistemic state, the agent has minimal objective knowledge”,
that is, the agent has as much ignorance as possible about the current state of the world. As
a consequence, there exists no epistemic state whose objective knowledge logically implies
the objective knowledge of another epistemic state.
There are several proposals in the literature based on the minimal knowledge paradigm
(see, e.g., [9,12,19,26]). Among them, the first attempt is due to Halpern and Moses [9]
and is the most similar to the notion of only knowing. Informally, Halpern and Moses
apply minimal knowledge to modal logic S5: thus, they define a preference semantics [27]
over S5, by considering as intended models of a modal theory Σ only those S5 models
satisfyingΣ in which the set of possible worlds is maximal with respect to set containment.
Hence, in this case the notion of maximization lies at the semantic level.
Recently, it has been proven [2] that reasoning in Halpern and Moses’ version of S5
(also known as ground nonmonotonic modal logic S5G) lies at the third level of the
polynomial hierarchy. In particular, logical implication in S5G is a 5
p
3-complete problem.
Moreover, many other formalisms based on the minimal knowledge paradigm share the
same computational properties of S5G [2,3,24]. Hence, we can conclude that (unless
the polynomial hierarchy collapses) minimal knowledge is computationally harder than
only knowing. In particular, S5G cannot be “polynomially embedded” into OL. This is
a surprising result, since the logic of only knowing is generally considered as a very
expressive formalism, due to its powerful ability of explicitly expressing minimization of
knowledge.
On the other hand, it can be shown that the reason why S5G (and more generally all
logics based on S5G) is computationally harder than OL (and all major propositional
nonmonotonic formalisms) is that S5G allows for expressing minimal knowledge states
in a more compact form than OL. See [25] for a detailed study of the epistemological
properties of S5G.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have defined a general method for reasoning about only knowing based
on deduction techniques developed for nonmonotonic modal logics, which proves the strict
similarity between these logics and Levesque’s monotonic formalism. Based on such a
reasoning method, we have investigated the computational properties of the propositional
fragment of Levesque’s modal logic of only knowing. Our analysis shows that the problem
of reasoning about only knowing in the propositional case lies at the second level of
the polynomial hierarchy, just like reasoning in most of the propositional formalisms for
nonmonotonic reasoning. We have also studied syntactic restrictions in which reasoning
about only knowing is easier than in the general case, and have shown the connections
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between such a restricted setting and the framework of epistemic queries to “classical”
knowledge bases [23].
We remark that a computational analysis of reasoning about only knowing is interesting
not only from a theoretical perspective, but also for the development of automated
reasoning procedures in the setting of reasoning about actions, where the logic of only
knowing has been recently applied [14,16].
One further development of the present work is towards the analysis of reasoning about
only knowing in the presence of quantifying-in: in particular, it should be interesting to see
whether it is possible to extend the techniques presented here for fragments of such a more
expressive case. This analysis may also take advantage of recent results on reasoning with
quantifying-in in standard modal logics [28].
Furthermore, the problem of embedding only knowing into nonmonotonic formalisms
(as autoepistemic logic or the logic S5G) is very interesting from the theoretical viewpoint,
in order to establish further relationships between reasoning about only knowing and other
forms of nonmonotonic reasoning.
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